



What is the nature of moral commitment?
Cognitivists claim that a person’s moral commitments consist,
at least in part, in their moral beliefs. So if Edgar is a moral
vegetarian, then Edgar believes that it is wrong to kill animals for
food. After all, we regularly describe our moral commitments as
moral beliefs, and thus it is plausible that we hold such beliefs
when we are so committed. Notice that Edgar’s belief that it is
wrong to kill animals for food is a moral belief, a belief with a
moral proposition as its object. A morally committed person
may hold moral beliefs, but that is not to say that a person’s
moral commitments involve no attitudes other than moral be-
lief. So, for example, a cognitivist could concede that, in being a
moral vegetarian, Edgar is averse to killing animals for food,
where Edgar’s aversion is a noncognitive attitude. Indeed,
a cognitivist might plausibly claim that Edgar is averse to eating
animals for food because he believes that it is wrong, and that
Edgar’s aversion is only an aspect of his moral commitment
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insofar as there are moral grounds for it. Cognitivists need not
deny that moral commitments involve noncognitive attitudes;
cognitivists claim only that moral beliefs are indispensable to
explaining a person’s moral commitments.
In contrast, noncognitivists claim that a person’s moral com-
mitments are best explained by attitudes other than moral belief.
While we may describe our moral commitments in terms of the
moral beliefs we hold, the sense in which we hold such beliefs is
best explained in terms of our noncognitive attitudes. Moral
beliefs may be dispensable to explaining moral commitment,
but that is not to say that a person’s moral commitments involve
no belief. So, for example, a noncognitivist could concede that, in
being committed to the claim that it was wrong of her to lie to
Edgar, Bernice believes that she lied to Edgar. It is just that this
belief is not a moral belief. Bernice may believe, but Bernice
believes no distinctively moral proposition. Noncognitivists need
not deny that moral commitments involve cognitive attitudes;
noncognitivists claim only that a person’s moral commitments
are best explained by attitudes other than belief in a moral
proposition.
So cognitivists claim that a person’s moral commitments are
best explained by the moral beliefs he holds while noncognitivists
claim that a person’s moral commitments are best explained by
attitudes other than moral belief. This diVerence is partly a
diVerence in the nature of the attitudes involved in moral com-
mitment (whether they are cognitive or noncognitive) and partly
a diVerence in the content of these attitudes (whether the cog-
nitive attitudes involved, if any, have moral propositions as their
objects). This explanatory diVerence, however, is a manifestation
of a more fundamental normative diVerence. Cognitivists and
noncognitivists fundamentally diVer about the norms governing
moral commitment: Whereas cognitivists maintain that they are
appropriate to belief in a moral proposition, noncognitivists deny
this, emphasizing instead the nonrepresentational function of
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moral commitment. (That the diVerence is fundamentally
znormative is substantiated by the argument of Section 1.9.)
Acceptance
In this dispute between cognitivists and noncognitivists, how are
we to determine the nature and content of the attitudes involved
in moral commitment?
Moral commitments are expressed by moral sentences and
incurred by competent speakers accepting moral sentences. As
this linguistic observation is common ground between the cog-
nitivist and the noncognitivist, one might begin with it and see if
moral commitment can be neutrally characterized in terms of
what a competent speaker is committed to in accepting a moral
sentence. The idea is that one might then determine, in a non-
question-begging manner, the nature and content of the atti-
tudes involved in moral commitment, by determining the nature
and content of the attitudes involved in accepting a moral sen-
tence. ‘Acceptance’ here is a technical term and is explicitly
stipulated to be neutral between cognitivist and noncognitivist
understandings of the commitment incurred. It is useful to have
a neutral term in order to pose the question whether the accept-
ance of a sentence in a given area is best understood as belief in
the proposition expressed or as some other attitude. (Here I am
following van Fraassen’s, 1980, usage.) The rationale for the
procedure is twofold: First, the content of the accepted moral
sentence is evidence about the contents of the relevant attitudes,
since it plausibly constrains the contents of the attitudes involved
in accepting that sentence. Second, the functional role of moral
acceptance, the role that moral acceptance plays in moral dis-
course and in the cognitive psychology of competent speakers, is
evidence about the nature of the relevant attitudes. Given this
terminology, the dispute between the cognitivist and the non-
cognitivist becomes the following: given the norms governing
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moral acceptance, is the acceptance of a moral sentence belief in
a moral proposition expressed?
Acceptance is best understood in terms of its role in inquiry.
Inquiry is not a solitary activity, at least not primarily. All suc-
cessful forms of inquiry, such as physics, economics, literary
theory, and so on, are public endeavors. Since successful forms
of inquiry are public endeavors, their results are nonaccidentally
presented in the medium of public language. Thus, for example,
biology is a domain of inquiry, and associated with it is a region
of discourse that involves a class of public language sentences
couched in the distinctive vocabulary of that discipline. Morality
itself constitutes a public domain of inquiry, albeit a distinctively
practical one. When a person deliberates about his obligations to
others, he inquires about his obligations to others and so engages
in moral inquiry. Given the point of a person’s deliberating about
his obligations to others, it is nonaccidental that the results of
such deliberation—and, indeed, the deliberation itself—can be
presented in the medium of public language. Thus, associated
with moral inquiry is a region of discourse that involves a class of
public language sentences couched in a distinctive vocabulary.
For the sake of simplicity, I will assume throughout that moral
vocabulary consists solely in a class of moral predicates (such as
‘good’ and ‘just’). This is a deliberate idealization: moral vocabu-
lary also includes substantives (such as ‘goodness’ and ‘justice’)
and, arguably at least, modal auxiliaries (such as ‘must’). How-
ever, these important grammatical distinctions will be irrelevant
to what follows.
The sentences of at least some regions of discourse express
propositions relative to a context of utterance. Normally,
the proposition expressed by a sentence is what is conveyed,
among other things, in uttering that sentence in that context.
Propositions are the primary bearers of truth and falsity. Sen-
tences may be evaluated as true or false, but they inherit their
truth-value from the proposition they express in the context of
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utterance. Moreover, propositions are the objects of attitudes
such as belief and assertion. This is not, of course, to claim that
all attitudes are propositional. Edgar may be averse to eating
meat, but the object of that attitude is not a proposition. I was
careful to say that the sentences of some regions of discourse
express propositions. Perhaps in other regions of discourse sen-
tences fail to express propositions, but rather have a nonrepre-
sentational content. So, while the sentences of at least some
regions of discourse express propositions relative to a context
of utterance, I will not assume that the sentences of every region
of discourse are representational in the sense of expressing pro-
positions that represent the putative subject matter of the given
domain of inquiry.
We are assuming that moral vocabulary consists solely in a
class of moral predicates. If moral predicates denote moral prop-
erties, then sentences that containmoral predicates express moral
propositions—propositions that attribute moral properties to
things. So conceived, the subject matter of moral inquiry would
be the existence and distribution of moral properties. It is in this
sense that we will understand the cognitivist’s claim that the
norms governing moral acceptance are appropriate to belief in
the moral proposition expressed by the accepted moral sentence,
and it is in this sense that we will understand the noncognitivist’s
denial. Instead, standard noncognitivists maintain that moral
predicates do not denote moral properties, and hence that the
sentences that contain them fail to express moral propositions;
rather, moral predicates play a nonrepresentational role in moral
discourse, and hence have a nonrepresentational content.
Public inquiry involves the production and the use of sentences
from the associated region of discourse. There are two aspects of
acceptance corresponding to these two features of public inquiry.
Accepting a sentence from the region of discourse is both the
object of inquiry and its grounds. Acceptance is the object of
inquiry in the sense that it is a state that represents the end of
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inquiry: in accepting a sentence, a person no longer takes himself
to have a reason to investigate further, to continue to inquire
whether or not to accept that sentence. Moreover, a person is
justiWed in accepting a sentence if he possesses suYcient reason to
inquire no further. Not only is acceptance the object of inquiry,
but it is also the grounds of inquiry: in accepting a sentence S, not
only does a person no longer take himself to have a reason to
continue to inquire about S, but he also relies on his acceptance of
S as grounds for further theoretical and practical inquiry. Accept-
ance is the grounds of inquiry in the sense that a person relies on
the acceptance of the sentence in theoretical and practical rea-
soning and takes himself to be justiWed in so doing. These two
aspects of acceptance are related: a person could be said to accept
a sentence only if he was prepared to rely on it in theoretical and
practical reasoning over a wide range of contexts. Moreover, a
person would be justiWed in relying on S in theoretical and
practical reasoning if he were justiWed in accepting S, if he had
suYcient reason to inquire no further.
Acceptance is governed by norms and so is subject to criticism.
Some of these norms are internal to the domain of inquiry;
others are external to it. In a certain cultural and historical
context, the acceptance of heliocentric astronomy may be criti-
cized as impious, at least by one relevant norm or standard of
impiety. However, the acceptance of heliocentric astronomy is
not bad astronomy. The charge of impiety is not an astronomical
criticism and relies on norms external to astronomical inquiry.
Given the norms internal to astronomical inquiry, the acceptance
of a heliocentric astronomy is not subject to criticism. Of course,
being acceptable by internal norms need not guarantee genuine
acceptability. The claim that Mercury rising has an unsettling
eVect on a person’s psychology might be acceptable, if it is, by
the norms of acceptance internal to astrology, but it is not
acceptable by external norms that many of us accept and regard
as authoritative.
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Acceptance can be tentative or full (see Harman, 1986: 46–7).
A person tentatively accepts a claim when, for example, he
accepts a hypothesis in order to work out its implications.
Thus, for example, while Edgar denies the axiom of choice, he
might nevertheless tentatively accept that axiom in order to work
out the implications of conjoining it with a standard set theory.
Though Edgar tentatively accepts the axiom of choice, he does
not fully accept it given his explicit denial. Notice that Edgar has
a reason to accept the axiom of choice only while he has a reason
to inquire after its implications for a standard set theory. Once he
discovers some relevant set of implications, inquiry ends and
there is no further need to accept the axiom. Tentative accept-
ance is not limited to supposition. To see this consider the
following. Bernice only tentatively accepts General Relativity.
Her acceptance of General Relativity is less than full acceptance
in the sense that she is self-consciously prepared to give it up:
she regards General Relativity as a very good approximation of
the truth but an imperfect approximation nonetheless. Bernice
has reason to accept General Relativity only while there is no
signiWcantly more accurate alternative. Tentative acceptance,
while distinct from full acceptance, is a matter of degree. The
degree of tentative acceptance depends on the extent to which a
person relies on the acceptance of a sentence in theoretical and
practical reasoning and the range of contexts in which a person
does so rely. Thus, Bernice’s tentative acceptance of General
Relativity is signiWcantly more extensive than Edgar’s tentative
acceptance of the axiom of choice. If, over time, and over a wide
range of contexts, a person comes to rely suYciently on the
acceptance of a sentence in theoretical and practical reasoning,
he may come to fully accept that sentence. Thus, the distinction
between tentative and full acceptance is best understood as an
approach to a limit.
In contrast to tentative acceptance, full acceptance ends in-
quiry. In fully accepting a sentence, the issue is closed, in the
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sense that there is no reason to inquire further. A person is
justiWed in fully accepting a sentence if, by the norms internal
to inquiry or by authoritative norms external to it, he possesses
suYcient reason to end inquiry. At issue in debate between
cognitivists and noncognitivists is the nature and content of the
attitudes involved in the full acceptance of moral sentences, and
so only the norms governing full moral acceptance are relevant.
To see this, consider the following. Bernice only tentatively
accepts General Relativity. Suppose that her tentative acceptance
falls short of belief. This would not establish that scientiWc
acceptance consists wholly in attitudes other than belief in
the accepted theory. Similarly, suppose that Edgar only tenta-
tively accepts that it is wrong to kill animals for food. Suppose,
moreover, that his tentative acceptance falls short of belief. This
would not establish that moral acceptance consists wholly in
attitudes other than belief in a moral proposition. It is the nature
and content of the attitudes involved in the full acceptance of a
moral sentence that is at issue in the debate between cognitivists
and noncognitivists. While cognitivists maintain that full moral
acceptance involves belief in the moral proposition expressed by
the accepted moral sentence, noncognitivists deny this. Thus,
only the norms governing full moral acceptance are relevant to
determining the cognitive status of moral commitment. Hence-
forth, by ‘acceptance’ I will mean full acceptance.
The Argument from Intransigence
Why think that moral acceptance is noncognitive?
According to familiar internalist arguments for noncogniti-
vism, there is a functional diVerence between moral acceptance
and belief: accepting a moral sentence motivates a person to
act in a way that belief does not. I will not argue in this way
for noncognitivism; rather, I will argue that there is an epistemic
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diVerence between moral acceptance and belief. I will not
argue that moral acceptance has a functional property that belief
lacks; rather, I will argue that belief has an epistemic property
that moral acceptance lacks. This epistemic diVerence is
brought out by the commitments incurred by reasonable and
interested people engaged in a certain kind of disagreement,
what Scanlon (1995) describes as a ‘disagreement about reasons.’
In cognitive inquiry, under certain conditions, people engaged in
a disagreement about reasons have a motive that, in moral
inquiry, under similar conditions, they would lack. This could
only be so if moral acceptance were noncognitive. Or so I will
argue.
Disagreements about Reasons
Suppose that Edgar and Bernice disagree about some sentence S.
While Edgar accepts S, Bernice rejects S. Though she rejects S,
Bernice strikes Edgar as an otherwise rational and reasonable
human being—she can at least think and talk as well as Edgar.
The mere fact of disagreement need not bother Edgar, for he
might plausibly think that their disagreement derives from Ber-
nice’s ignorance of the relevant evidence. Suppose, however, that
Edgar engages Bernice in discussion and rules out this possibility:
Edgar and Bernice share a common body of evidence. Not only is
Bernice fully informed about the evidence that Edgar accepts,
but she is also internally coherent in taking that evidence as a
reason for rejecting S—just as Edgar is internally coherent in
taking that evidence as a reason for accepting S. While they share
a common body of evidence, they nonetheless disagree about its
epistemic signiWcance and are internally coherent in doing so.
Given that each is internally coherent, each can oVer what the
other would regard as a question-begging argument for their
acceptance or rejection of S. So both are otherwise rational and
reasonable, fully informed, and can oVer what the other would
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regard as a question-begging argument for their acceptance or
rejection of S.
Edgar and Bernice’s positions conXict: they disagree about
whether to accept or reject S. However, if we focus solely on
the fact of conXict, wewill miss something important about their
disagreement. For Edgar and Bernice disagree not only about
which sentence to accept in the given circumstance, they appar-
ently disagree about what would count as a reason for accept-
ance in the given circumstance. Edgar and Bernice disagree
about the norms governing acceptance: they implicitly accept
distinct principles that determine what would count as a reason
for acceptance in the given circumstance. This is manifest in a
phenomenological diVerence between them. From Edgar’s per-
spective, certain features of their circumstances are salient and
have a certain normative appearance—they seem to be reasons
for accepting S. From Bernice’s perspective, potentially distinct
features of their circumstances are salient and have a diVerent
normative appearance—they seem to be reasons for rejecting S.
The world, as they commonly understand it, diVers in the nor-
mative appearance it presents to each. Since Edgar and Bernice
disagree not only about S but also what would count as a reason
for accepting or rejecting S, their disagreement is a disagreement
about reasons.
To get a better sense of this, consider how the traditional
problem of induction can be recast as a disagreement about
reasons. Suppose that Edgar is an inductivist: he believes that
the regularities manifest in his experience are representative of
the regularities that obtain in nature generally, even in the
unobserved portions of nature. Suppose Edgar discovers that
other people with distinct scientiWc traditions and cultures dis-
agree with him. Bernice, for example, is a counterinductivist. Far
from accepting the uniformity of nature, Bernice’s beliefs about
the unobservable are guided by a diVerent principle, the non-
uniformity of nature: Bernice believes that her experience is
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positively misleading in the sense that an observed regularity is
evidence that it does not obtain in nature generally—indeed, that
it will fail in the very next instance. Though she denies the
uniformity of nature, Bernice strikes Edgar as an otherwise
rational and reasonable human being—she can at least think
and talk as well as Edgar. The mere fact of disagreement need
not bother Edgar, for he might plausibly think their disagree-
ment derives from Bernice’s ignorance of the relevant evidence.
Bernice might have been raised in an idiosyncratic, environmen-
tal niche where observed regularities are an unreliable guide to
the regularities that obtain more generally in that environment,
or she might have somehow failed to reXect adequately on what
must have been a track record of predictive failure. Suppose,
however, that Edgar engages Bernice in conversation and rules
out these possibilities. It seems possible that Edgar may come,
over time, to think that, just as his acceptance of the uniformity
of nature is coherent given all the evidence, so is Bernice’s
acceptance of the nonuniformity of nature. So both are other-
wise rational and reasonable, fully informed, and can oVer what
the other would regard as a question-begging argument for their
epistemic positions.
When Edgar and Bernice disagree about some theoretical
sentence S, their epistemic positions conXict: they disagree
about whether to accept or reject S. However, if we focus solely
on the fact of conXict, we will miss something important about
their disagreement. For Edgar and Bernice disagree not only
about which sentence to accept in the given circumstance, they
apparently disagree about what would count as a reason
for acceptance in the given circumstance. Edgar accepts a prin-
ciple according towhich observable regularities count as a reason
to accept that such regularities obtain in nature more generally,
even in the unobserved parts of nature. Bernice, in contrasts,
accepts a principle according to which observable regularities
count as a reason to reject that such regularities obtain in nature
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more generally. So Edgar and Bernice not only disagree about S,
they implicitly accept distinct principles that determine what
would count as a reason for acceptance. This is manifest in a
phenomenological diVerence between them. From Edgar’s per-
spective, observable regularities are salient and appear to be a
reason for believing that they obtain in nature more generally.
From Bernice’s perspective, observable regularities are salient
and appear to be a reason for believing that they do not obtain
in nature more generally. Since Edgar and Bernice disagree not
only about S but also about what would count as a reason for
accepting or rejecting S, their disagreement is a disagreement
about reasons.
The disagreements described above, where the participants are
otherwise rational and reasonable, fully informed, and can oVer
what the other would regard as a question-begging argument for
their acceptance or rejection of S, are highly idealized. Indeed, so
described, no such disagreements ever occur. No two people ever
share precisely the same information, and it is impossible to say
in advance of inquiry what information will be relevant to the
acceptance or rejection of S. So no actual disagreement involves
full information in the way described. These idealized cases of
disagreement are nonetheless useful in dramatizing what is at
issue in disagreement about reasons. What is at issue is not only
whether to accept or reject S, but what would count as a reason
to accept or reject S. What is at issue is the correct relevant
principle that determines what counts as a reason for accepting
or rejecting S in the given circumstance:
Disagreement about Reasons
In a disagreement about reasons, the disputants not only
disagree about whether to accept or reject some sentence S,
they disagree about what would count as a reason to accept
or reject S in the given circumstance. SpeciWcally, in a
disagreement about reasons, the disputants, at least impli-
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citly, accept distinct principles that count potentially distinct
features of the circumstance as reasons for the acceptance
or rejection of S.
Disagreements about reasons, however, need not occur in so
idealized a form. So, for example, otherwise rational and reason-
able palaeontologists can agree about the fossil record and yet
disagree about what that record establishes. If they do, they are
engaged in a disagreement about reasons: each implicitly
accepts distinct principles that count potentially distinct aspects
of the fossil record as reasons for the acceptance or rejection of
the target claim. Similarly, constructivists and classical math-
ematicians disagree about what counts as a reason for accepting
a mathematical sentence. Not only are methodological disputes
in the special sciences disagreements about reasons, but so are
disagreements that result from diVerent styles of inductive rea-
soning. Disagreements about reasons may be theoretical, but
they can be practical as well. Thus, Scanlon writes:
[Disagreement about reasons] is surely possible and perhaps even com-
mon. I think that it is plausible to suggest thatwe have an example of it in
the contemporary disagreement between secular liberals like me, who
see nothing morally objectionable about homosexuality, and conserva-
tive Christians who believe that it is a serious wrong. (Scanlon 1995: 352)
While in their idealized form disagreements about reasons
plausibly never occur, in less idealized form such disagreements
are plausibly ubiquitous.
Reacting to Disagreement
What is the rational response to a disagreement about reasons?
If we conWne ourselves to what can be deontically described,
then not only is it rationally permissible for Edgar to persist in his
acceptance of S, but it is also rationally permissible for Edgar to
revise—to reject or suspend judgment concerning S.
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Edgar’s persistence in his acceptance of S might be rationally
permissible on a number of grounds. So, for example, in a
cognitive domain Edgar might persist in his acceptance of S,
despite the disagreement about reasons, on the grounds of
doxastic conservativism.
Doxastic conservativism is the epistemic policy of persisting in
one’s beliefs unless presented with a positive reason to change
one’s mind (see Harman, 1986: chapter 4). Since the evidence’s
having a diVerent normative appearance for Bernice is not a
positive reason for Edgar to change his mind, if doxastic con-
servativism is a genuine epistemic norm, then it is rationally
permissible for Edgar to persist in his belief that S. Doxastic
conservativism is not the only grounds for the rational permis-
sibility of persistence. Suppose, owing to some psychological
necessity, Edgar simply cannot give up his acceptance of S.
Since he must accept S, and is not self-contradictory or otherwise
internally incoherent in so doing, it might be rationally permis-
sible for him to persist in his acceptance of S.
Just as it is rationally permissible for Edgar to persist in his
acceptance of S, it is rationally permissible for him to revise—to
reject or suspend judgment concerning S. Revision might be
rationally permissible on a number of grounds. So, for example,
it might be rationally permissible for Edgar to revise if, upon
reXection, he came to accept a debunking explanation for the
disagreement between himself and Bernice, i.e. if he came to
explain their disagreement in terms accidentally connected
to reasons for acceptance. (See Cohen’s, 2000, discussion of the
paradox of conviction.)
Coming to accept a debunking explanation is not the only
grounds for the rational permissibility of revision. Suppose that
Edgar came to believe that there is a perfect symmetry between
his epistemic position and Bernice’s. Edgar could not coherently
be a cognitivist and persist in accepting S, and in accepting that
Bernice is wrong in rejecting S, while maintaining that there is a
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perfect epistemic symmetry between them. (See Rosen’s, 2001,
discussion of the dispute between realists and Wctionalists about
abstracta.) If reXection on the disagreement about reasons
prompts Edgar to accept a debunking explanation of their dis-
agreement, or to accept that there is a perfect epistemic sym-
metry between himself and Bernice, then it would be rationally
permissible for Edgar to revise—to reject or suspend judgment
concerning S.
If we conWne ourselves to what can be deontically described,
then it would seem that persistence and revision are both ration-
ally permissible. However, there is an important aspect of the
rational response to a disagreement about reasons that has so far
been left out of account. While, in the context of a disagreement
about reasons, persistence and revision are both rationally per-
missible, sometimes at least, if acceptance is cognitive, there is
something epistemically admirable about at least considering
revising. After all, retaining belief on the grounds of conservati-
vism, psychological necessity, and the like can seem like a reluc-
tant capitulation to epistemic necessity. At any rate, acquiescing
on such grounds is hardly a cognitive achievement. In contrast,
a decision to reconsider manifests a responsiveness to reasons
that is itself manifestly reasonable. Upon determining that his
disagreement with Bernice is, at bottom, a disagreement about
reasons, Edgar might be motivated to re-examine his reasons for
accepting S. Edgar might inquire further into the grounds of his
acceptance to determine whether, in light of his discussion with
Bernice, his reasons for acceptance are good reasons. He might
also inquire further to determine, in light of his discussion with
Bernice, what, if anything, there is to Bernice’s reasons for
rejection. After all, Bernice might be onto something that so
far eludes Edgar. While Edgar is not rationally required to
inquire further into the grounds of acceptance, in the sense
that his failure to do so would not be epistemically blameworthy,
there would be something epistemically admirable about his
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inquiring further. There is something cognitively virtuous about
being motivated to inquire further into the grounds of accept-
ance in the face of a disagreement about reasons. If that is right,
then there is a normative aspect of belief that is not describable in
deontic vocabulary. Belief involves a cognitive virtue not describ-
able in terms of rational permissibility. (See Rosen, 2001, for a
similar suggestion.)
Two Kinds of Rational Norm
How are we to understand this? Here is one suggestion.
There are two kinds of rational norm.
The Wrst kind of rational norm are those norms governing
combinations of sentences that are candidates for acceptance.
They take the form of principles determining whether combin-
ations of sentences are rationally permissible, forbidden, or ob-
ligatory to accept. In a cognitive domain, they represent
substantive judgments about the requirements of explanatory
coherence on the epistemic state of a person at a time. A failure
to conform to such a norm (by accepting a rationally forbidden
combination of sentences, say) is irrational or, at the very least,
epistemically blameworthy.
However, if acceptance is conceived as part of the broader
activity of inquiry, where inquiry is one activity among many,
then it is plausible that inquiry involves other kinds of norms as
well. Just as there are rational norms governing combinations of
sentences that are candidates for acceptance, it is plausible as well
that there are rational norms governing the ends involved in
inquiry. They represent the requirements on the ends to be
adopted in changing one’s epistemic state over time. So, for
example, it is plausible to suppose that people who are motivated
to inquire whether to accept S are rationally obliged to adopt
means for determining whether to accept S consistent with other
ends that they have adopted. Not only does inquiry, conceived as
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a complex activity, involve the adoption of appropriate instru-
mental ends, but it is plausible as well that there are noninstru-
mental ends internal to inquiry that people engaged in that
activity are rationally obliged to adopt.
To see this, consider the following. Suppose that Edgar accepts
certain sentences that are indirectly inconsistent. The sentences
that he accepts are not directly inconsistent—he does not simul-
taneously accept both a sentence and its negation. Rather, he
accepts certain sentences such that there is a possible argument,
each step of which involves immediate implications of the sen-
tences he accepts to a conclusion that leaves this pattern of
acceptance directly inconsistent. Is Edgar thereby irrational?
No. He might have good reasons for accepting each of these
sentences and might not recognize that they are indirectly incon-
sistent. Suppose that Edgar comes to recognize that the sen-
tences he accepts are indirectly inconsistent. Perhaps Bernice
has explicitly given him the argument leading to direct inconsist-
ency. Edgar would be rationally obliged as an inquirer to adopt
the end of resolving this inconsistency. It is in this sense that
resolving such inconsistency is an end internal to inquiry.
While Edgar may be obliged as an inquirer to adopt the end of
resolving this inconsistency, it would not be irrational for Edgar
to persist in his acceptance, saying to Bernice: ‘That’s really
interesting, I’ll have to think about that later, but right now
I have to pick up the kids.’ In the meantime, Edgar may persist
in accepting the indirectly inconsistent sentences, taking care not
to infer everything that is implied by them. (Recall, if you can,
your initial reaction to the Liar paradox, or to Zeno’s paradox.)
Edgar’s discovery that the sentences he accepts are indirectly
inconsistent may rationally oblige him as an inquirer to adopt a
certain end—namely, the end of resolving this inconsistency—
but there is latitude in the fulWlment of this end. Resolving this
inconsistency might be hampered by inevitable practical exigen-
cies. After all, a person has a plurality of ends and the fulWlment
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of these must be rationally ordered. Rationally ordering adopted
ends involves, among other things, prioritizing ends, scheduling
means towards their fulWlment, and choosing means compatible
with other ends. So the end of resolving the indirect inconsist-
ency must in this way harmonize with other ends that Edgar has
adopted (such as executing the daily routines involved in child-
care). Whereas the content of the rational norm is purely epi-
stemic—it requires only the adoption of an end internal to
inquiry, the conditions for the fulWlment of this norm are not
purely epistemic—acting on the obligatory end is constrained by
considerations of practical coherence. Thus, there is latitude in
the fulWlment of this end, and a failure to act towards its fulWl-
ment merely lacks epistemic merit and is neither an instance of
irrationality nor in any way epistemically blameworthy (though
perhaps adopting the policy of never acting towards its fulWlment
might be). I may not have resolved to my satisfaction the Liar
paradox; I may never do so. But that does not make me ir-
rational. My resolution of the paradox might be epistemically
admirable, it might have epistemic merit; but my failure to do so
is neither an instance of irrationality nor in any way epistemically
blameworthy.
Inquiry thus involves two kinds of rational norm. On the one
hand, there are rational norms governing combinations of sen-
tences that are candidates for acceptance. They represent the
requirements of explanatory coherence on the epistemic state of
a person at a time. These are strict obligations. On the other
hand, there are rational norms governing the ends involved in
inquiry. They represent requirements on the ends to be adopted
in changing one’s epistemic state over time. These are lax obli-
gations. Their laxity consists in the latitude involved in the
fulWlment of these obligations, since an obligatory end is one
end among many and a person’s ends must be rationally ordered.
The failure to fulWl a strict obligation is irrational or, at the very
least, epistemically blameworthy. In contrast, any particular
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action taken to fulWl a lax obligation is epistemically meritorious,
while any particular failure to act merely lacks epistemic merit
and is neither an instance of irrationality nor epistemically
blameworthy (though perhaps adopting the policy of never act-
ing to fulWl the lax obligation would be). Cognoscenti will recog-
nize this as an application to the epistemic case of the distinction
between perfect and imperfect duties (see Kant, 1785/1999:
4:421–3; 1797/1999: 6: 390–1.)
In a disagreement about reasons, persistence and revision are
both rationally permissible. As such, the epistemic states involved
in persistence and revision are in violation of no strict obligation.
However, there is something admirable about at least consider-
ing revising, and this suggests the presence of a lax obligation,
i.e. the presence of a rational obligation to adopt a certain end.
What end could this be? Upon determining that his disagreement
with Bernice is, at bottom, a disagreement about reasons, Edgar
is under a lax obligation to inquire further into the grounds of
acceptance. More precisely, given that he is interested in the truth
of S, Edgar, in the context of a disagreement about reasons, has a
reason to re-examine his reasons for accepting S, at least if his
disputant is otherwise rational and reasonable, informed, and
similarly interested in inquiring about S.
Let me explain. Even in the context of a disagreement about
reasons, whether a person has a reason to inquire further de-
pends on his interest in the truth of S. After all, ‘The truth, the
whole truth, and nothing but the truth’ has never been a reason-
able norm of inquiry. Absent some special interest, there is no
reason to know whether Genghis Khan ever suVered from a
hangnail, say. (See Harman, 1986: 55–6, for an explanation of
the indispensability of interest in terms of the Wnite nature
of inquirers.) However, given his interest in the truth of S, in
the context of a disagreement about reasons, Edgar would have a
motive to inquire further into the grounds of acceptance—or, at
least, he would be so motivated if Bernice were otherwise
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rational and reasonable, informed, and similarly interested in
inquiring about S. Obviously, Edgar would lack this motive if
Bernice were irrational, or unreasonable, or ignorant, or were
moved by ulterior motives unconnected with reasons for accept-
ance. But if she is none of these, Edgar would have a motive to
inquire further into his grounds for acceptance to determine
whether, in light of his discussion with Bernice, his reasons for
acceptance are good reasons. Edgar would also have a motive to
inquire further to determine, in light of his discussion with Ber-
nice, what, if anything, there is to Bernice’s reasons for rejection.
After all, Bernicemightbeonto something that so fareludesEdgar.
To inquire further is to strive tobe responsive towhat reasons there
are. This would involve seriously considering the alternatives and
so questioning the evidential status of initial appearances. While
persistence is rationally permissible, Edgar must be prepared to
bracket his full acceptance of S when re-examining his reasons for
acceptance.Of course, there is latitude in the fulWlment of this end.
Further inquiry is one end amongmany, and a person’s ends must
be rationally ordered—perhaps Edgar has more compelling im-
mediate concerns. If, however, Edgar were to fulWl this end, he
might satisfy himselfwith his acceptance of S, or hemight suspend
judgment concerning S, or might even reject S. Whatever the
outcome, Edgar’s noncomplacency in inquiring further would
be epistemically admirable. Moreover, a failure to act towards the
fulWlment of this end, to become responsive towhat reasons there
are, would merely lack epistemic merit and would be neither an
instanceof irrationalitynor in anywayepistemicallyblameworthy.
Striving to be responsive towhat reasons there are is, in this sense,
a manifestation of cognitive virtue.
Two Kinds of Acceptance
The discussion so far provides preliminary support for the fol-
lowing claim:
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Noncomplacency
If acceptance is cognitive, then, in the context of a disagree-
ment about reasons, a person is under a lax obligation to
inquire further into the grounds of acceptance. SpeciWcally,
if a person is interested in the truth of S, then, in the context
of a disagreement about reasons, he would have a reason to
re-examine his grounds for accepting S, at least if his dispu-
tant is otherwise rational and reasonable, informed, and
similarly interested in inquiring about S.
Why should a disagreement about reasons motivate a person
to inquire further into the grounds of acceptance? Perhaps the
value of being reasonable constitutes a reason to inquire further.
After all, in the face of a disagreement about reasons, to inquire
further into the grounds of acceptance is to strive to be respon-
sive to what reasons there are. Perhaps, then, in the context of a
disagreement about reasons, if a person is interested in the truth
of S, the value of being reasonable constitutes a reason to inquire
further into the grounds of acceptance in the sense that part of
what it is to be reasonable is to be so motivated in such circum-
stances (just as part of what it is to be benevolent is to be
motivated by the good of others).
While initially plausible, noncomplacency is nevertheless con-
troversial. A reasonable person interested in the truth of S would
be motivated to inquire further if, in that context, it were open to
reXective doubt about whether his reasons for acceptance were
genuine reasons. But why must a disagreement about reasons
invariably generate reXective doubt about the disputants’
reasons? A disagreement about reasons would generate reXective
doubt about the disputants’ reasons if there were an acknow-
ledged epistemic symmetry between them. But, in the context of
any actual disagreement, it is plausibly always open to a person
to simply deny that the symmetry obtains. Suppose that
Bernice accepts that the Earth is Xat and is ideally coherent in
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so accepting: Bernice is otherwise rational and reasonable,
informed, and can oVer what Edgar would regard as a ques-
tion-begging argument for her acceptance of the Xat earth hy-
pothesis. If Edgar is like us, he would reject any suggestion that
there is a perfect epistemic symmetry between himself and
Bernice but would maintain, instead, that he, and not Bernice,
is appropriately related to the shape of the earth. Thus, it is
implausible to suppose that Edgar’s disagreement about reasons
with an ideally coherent Xat-earther would generate reXective
doubt about his reasons for rejecting the Xat earth hypothesis,
and hence it is implausible to suppose that he would be motiv-
ated to inquire further into the grounds of his rejection, if
interested. In the absence of such reXective doubt, a reasonable
person interested in the truth of S may not be motivated to
inquire further into the grounds of acceptance. In the absence of
a special reason to doubt his reasons, a reasonable person inter-
ested in the truth of S may be satisWed that he is simply better
placed to appreciate the facts.
The credibility of noncomplacency is thus subject to two
apparently conXicting reactions: While initially plausible, it is
controversial upon reXection. These apparently conXicting reac-
tions would be reconciled, however, if it turned out that they
were reactions to diVerent things. Indeed, I believe that they are
reactions to diVerent things, for noncomplacency is ambiguous.
They are two kinds of acceptance that are governed by distinct
norms. Thus, noncomplacency can be understood as a claim
about the norms governing one kind of acceptance or the
other. Understood one way, this is plausible; understood the
other way, it is controversial and plausibly false.
When a competent speaker accepts a sentence, he may
accept that sentence for himself, but, importantly, he might do
more than that. Not only may he accept the sentence for himself,
but he might also accept that sentence on behalf of others.
Acceptance for oneself is the object of individual inquiry. If
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a competent speaker accepts a sentence S for himself, then he
takes himself to have suYcient reason to end his individual
inquiry about S. So if Edgar accepts ‘The UCL Philosophy
Department is located at 19 Gordon Square’ he has no further
reason to inquire about the address. (Of course, he might still
have a reason to ask Bernice what that address is—say, in order to
determine whether Bernice knows that address. However,
in asking Bernice, Edgar is not inquiring after the address;
rather, he is inquiring after Bernice’s knowledge of that address.)
Acceptance for oneself is also the grounds of individual inquiry:
if a competent speaker accepts S for himself, then he takes
himself to have suYcient reason to rely on his acceptance of
S in further theoretical and practical reasoning. So, for example,
Edgar may rely on his acceptance of the address to estimate
the time it would take to get there from his present location.
Whereas acceptance for oneself is both the object and the
grounds of individual inquiry, acceptance on behalf of others is
the object and grounds of public inquiry: if a competent speaker
accepts S on behalf of others, he takes himself to have suYcient
reason to end public inquiry about S. Suppose Bernice asks Edgar
for the address of the UCL Philosophy Department. If
Edgar accepts the address on behalf of others, then, by his lights,
there is no need for Bernice to inquire further—she may
simply take his word for it. By his lights, his acceptance of the
address can stand proxy for her own reasoning in inquiring about
that address. Acceptance on behalf of others is also the
grounds of public inquiry: if a competent speaker accepts S on
behalf of others, he takes himself to have suYcient reason for
others to rely on his acceptance of S in their own theoretical
and practical reasoning. So, if Edgar accepts the address on
behalf of others, then, by his lights, Bernice can rely on that
address in her own theoretical and practical reasoning—she may,
for example, rely on that address as a partial means of getting
there.
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The two kinds of acceptance involved in individual and public
inquiry are governed by distinct norms. Thus, if a competent
speaker accepts S on behalf of others, then he must coherently
suppose, at least implicitly, that others do not accept reasons that
would undermine his acceptance of S. (Harman, 1986: 51, ob-
serves that, in this respect, acceptance on behalf of others is like
speaking on behalf of a group.) Suppose that Bernice asks Edgar
where the UCL Philosophy Department is and he says that it is at
19 Gordon Square. Suppose, however, that Bernice has seen a
Xyer announcing that the Philosophy Department has moved
from that address but she cannot now remember the ‘new’
address. Bernice would then accept a reason that undermines
Edgar acceptance of that address. Thus, Edgar would not be
justiWed in accepting that address on behalf of others because
others, who are otherwise rational and reasonable, informed,
and interested in inquiring about the address, accept undermin-
ing reasons and so reasonably reject that address. Nevertheless,
Edgar could be justiWed in accepting the address for himself.
Suppose that Edgar does not give full credence to the Xyer.
Perhaps he coherently supposes that it is a prank. Though
Edgar cannot give Bernice a reason suYcient to rule out the
evidence provided by the Xyer, he does not give it credence, is
coherent in not giving it credence, and continues to accept the
‘old’ address. While Edgar would not be justiWed in accepting the
address on behalf of others, he would be justiWed in accepting
that address for himself. This could be so only if acceptance for
oneself and acceptance on behalf of others were governed by
distinct norms.
This is further conWrmed by the following. Suppose that Edgar
is motivated to accept the address not only for himself but on
behalf of others as well. (Suppose that Edgar and Bernice have a
joint appointment there.) He might then look for evidence that
would explain away the Xyer. What explains his further inquiry is
his motivation to accept the sentence on behalf of others coupled
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with the fact that he takes himself to be justiWed in accepting it
for himself. After all, if Edgar did not take himself to be justiWed
in accepting the sentence for himself, then why bother looking
for evidence that would explain away the undermining reason
provided by the Xyer?
In a cognitive domain, being justiWed in accepting a sentence
for oneself and being appropriately related to the facts is no
guarantee that one has suYcient reason to accept the sentence
on behalf of others. Suppose that Edgar were correct in suppos-
ing the Xyer to be a prank. Edgar would be justiWed in accepting
the ‘old’ address and is appropriately related to the facts. How-
ever, Edgar would not be justiWed in accepting this on behalf of
others since others who are otherwise rational and reasonable,
informed, and similarly motivated coherently accept undermin-
ing reasons and, hence, reasonably reject the ‘old’ address. So
just because a person is appropriately related to the facts is no
guarantee that he possesses suYcient reason to accept S on
behalf of others.
Noncomplacency can be understood as a claim about the
norms governing acceptance for oneself or as a claim about
the norms governing acceptance on behalf of others. Understood
as a claim about acceptance for oneself, noncomplacency is false.
Absent reXective doubt about his reasons for accepting S, Edgar
is under no obligation to inquire further into the grounds of
acceptance even if he is interested in the truth of S, and the mere
fact of a disagreement about reasons is in general insuYcient to
generate such reXective doubt, even if his disputant is otherwise
rational and reasonable, informed, and interested in the accept-
ability of S. Suppose, however, that Edgar is interested in
accepting S not only for himself, but on behalf of others as
well. (Perhaps the truth or falsity of S is relevant to a joint
endeavor that Edgar is undertaking with Bernice, or perhaps
they are participants of a public inquiry engaged in competing
research programs.) In accepting S on behalf of others, Edgar
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must coherently suppose, at least implicitly, that others who are
otherwise rational and reasonable, informed, and interested in
inquiring about S do not accept undermining reasons and hence,
reasonably, reject S. Unfortunately, Bernice, who is otherwise
rational and reasonable, informed, and interested in inquiring
about S, accepts a reason that would undermine Edgar’s accept-
ance of S. So, in the context of a disagreement about reasons,
Edgar would lack suYcient reason to accept S on behalf of others
even if he had suYcient reason to accept S for himself and were
appropriately related to the facts. Since Edgar is interested in
accepting S on behalf of others but lacks suYcient reason to do
so, he would be motivated to inquire further into the grounds of
acceptance to discover, if he can, grounds for accepting S that
otherwise rational and reasonable, informed persons who are
interested in inquiring about S could not reasonably reject.
Inquiring further into the grounds of acceptance is an obligatory
end of public inquiry for those engaged in a disagreement about
reasons.
Moral Authority
Noncomplacency should be understood as a claim about the
norms governing acceptance on behalf of others. The idea is
that, if a person is interested in the truth of S, then, in the context
of a disagreement about reasons, he would have a reason to re-
examine his grounds for accepting S, at least if his disputant is
otherwise rational and reasonable, informed, and similarly inter-
ested in inquiring about S. One distinctive feature of morality (or
at least that part of morality that Gibbard, 1990, describes as
‘morality in the narrow sense’ and that Scanlon, 1998, describes
as the domain of ‘what we owe to each other’) is its authority.
Given the nature of its authority, moral acceptance is always
acceptance on behalf of others. This is epistemically signiWcant—
for, taken together with noncomplacency, it has the following
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important consequence: if moral acceptance is cognitive, then, in
the context of a disagreement about reasons, a person is under a
lax obligation to inquire further into the grounds of moral
acceptance.
Morality is authoritative. After all, while morality in some
sense answers to our concerns, it is also in some sense independ-
ent of them. The authority of morality is manifest in the role it
plays in moral discourse and in the cognitive psychology of
competent speakers. A full account of that authority would
involve specifying its source in a way that made it intelligible
that it should exhibit that role. However, without giving a full
account of moral authority, a partial description of the role it
plays in moral discourse and in the cognitive psychology of
competent speakers suYces to establish that moral acceptance
is always acceptance on behalf of others.
In sincerely uttering a moral sentence that he understands,
a competent speaker accepts the uttered moral sentence, and, in
accepting it he accepts as well what reason is thereby provided.
Bernice accepts that abortion is wrong and thereby accepts as
well a reason not to have an abortion if pregnant. Moreover, the
reason that Bernice accepts, if genuine, potentially overrides
whatever reason she might have to have an abortion if pregnant.
Not only do moral reasons potentially override whatever con-
Xicting nonmoral reasons we have for acting in the given cir-
cumstance, but they can also potentially cancel such reasons in
that circumstance (see Frankfurt, 1988, chapter 13; McDowell,
1998: 55–6, 91–3; and Scanlon, 1998: 156–7). Sometimes a moral
reason doesn’t so much outweigh nonmoral inclination as dis-
counts it as a reason for acting in the given circumstance. It is
implausible to claim that moral reasons necessarily override or
cancel all conXicting nonmoral reasons. Suppose Bernice prom-
ises to meet Edgar, but an important and rare opportunity arises
such that Bernice cannot avail herself of that opportunity if she
fulWls her promise to Edgar. If the opportunity were important
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enough, and the promise was lightly given and of no great
consequence to Edgar, then what reason there is to avail herself
of that opportunity might outweigh the reason she has to meet
Edgar (which is not, of course, to say that amends should not be
made). While moral reasons do not always override or cancel
conXicting nonmoral reasons, they very often do, and it is part of
their nature and importance that they do. Thus, the moral
reasons conveyed by our moral utterances often take precedence
over conXicting nonmoral reasons:
Precedence
In uttering a moral sentence that he understands, a compe-
tent speaker conveys a reason to act in a given circumstance
that potentially overrides or cancels any conXicting non-
moral reasons available in that circumstance. (Precedence
is a variant of what Rawls, 1971, and Scanlon, 1998, describe
as ‘the priority of right.’)
In accepting the wrongness of abortion, not only does Bernice
accept a reason that takes precedence over nonmoral reasons,
but she also takes the reason not to be contingent upon her
acceptance of it. The acceptance of a moral reason is not a
matter of taste. Of course, that something is to your taste is
often a reason to prefer it. Bernice has a taste for westerns and
distastes musicals. In deciding to watch one of two movies,
a western and a musical, satisfying her taste for westerns consti-
tutes a reason to watch the western rather than the musical.
Moral reasons diVer from matters of taste not in the sense that
the former are reasons whereas the latter are not, but in the kind
of reason they are.
According to Gibbard (1990: 164–6), if something is a matter of
taste, satisfying that taste would not constitute a good reason if
one lacked that taste. Bernice would not have a reason to watch
the western if instead musicals were to her taste. In accepting
something as a matter of taste, a person does not take that reason
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to apply independently of his accepting it: if he lacked that taste,
he would lack that reason. (N.B.: The sense of ‘taste’ that Gib-
bard deploys is the one associated with the de gustibus motto and
is distinct from the sense of taste whose standard Hume sought
to establish.) Matters are diVerent with moral reasons. In accept-
ing that abortion is wrong, Bernice accepts a reason not to have
an abortion if pregnant. Moreover, Bernice believes that
she would still have a reason not to have an abortion if instead
she accepted that abortion was morally permissible. The moral
reason not to have an abortion applies, if it does at all, independ-
ently of Bernice’s accepting it. Indeed, it applies, if it does at all,
independently of anyone’s accepting it. Emma does not accept
that abortion is wrong because she is unsure about the moral
status of abortion. Though Emma does not accept that abortion
is wrong, Bernice believes that Emma has a reason not to have an
abortion if pregnant even though Emma does not accept that
reason. In accepting a moral reason, a person takes that reason to
apply independently of a person’s accepting it. The content of a
moral reason is not linked to a person’s acceptance of it the way a
reason of taste is. If an action is wrong in a given circumstance,
then everyone who is in that circumstance has a reason not to
perform that action, whether or not they accept that reason:
Noncontingency
In uttering a moral sentence that he understands, the exist-
ence of the reason conveyed is not contingent upon the
speaker’s or anyone else’s accepting it.
In accepting the wrongness of abortion, not only does Bernice
accept a reason that takes precedence over nonmoral reasons,
that is not contingent upon her acceptance of it, but she also
believes that she has good reason to accept that it is wrong
and that this is a reason, not only for her, but for everyone else
as well. Emma, unlike Bernice, does not accept that abortion
is wrong, but from Bernice’s perspective Emma is thereby
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unreasonable, if not indeed irrational. Bernice regards Emma
as unreasonable in the sense that Emma is not responding to
what reason there is to accept the wrongness of abortion. (She is
not, however, irrational, at least not in the narrow sense of acting
at variance with a reason she accepts.) The putative reason that
Bernice has for accepting that abortion is wrong is a reason for
everyone to accept that abortion is wrong, or would be if it were
a genuine reason. We might describe this as well-groundedness: In
uttering a moral sentence that he understands, the reason a
competent speaker has, if sincere, for accepting the uttered
moral sentence applies not only to the speaker but to everyone
else as well.
There is a complication, however. Emma is unsure about the
moral status of abortion. Suppose, however, she comes to regard
Bernice’s moral opinion as authoritative in this instance. Perhaps,
Emma trusts Bernice’s moral sensibility more than her own in
the given circumstance. While Emma is sure that Bernice has a
good reason to accept the wrongness of abortion, Emma herself
remains unclear about that reason—she is unclear about which
features of her circumstance count as a reason for the impermis-
sibility of abortion, or even why these features should have this
normative signiWcance. Emma’s reason for accepting the wrong-
ness of abortion is that Bernice advises her that it is wrong.
However, this is not a reason for someone who does not trust
Bernice’s moral sensibility the way Emma does. So Emma’s
reason for accepting the wrongness of abortion is not a reason
for others to accept the wrongness of abortion. Thus, well-
groundedness is false as presently formulated. Can this principle
be reformulated to accommodate this complexity? Emma’s rea-
son for accepting the wrongness of abortion is that Bernice
advises her that it is wrong. Bernice’s advice is a reason, if it is,
because Bernice has good reason for the wrongness of abortion.
This reason, if genuine, is a grounding reason, since it is the
grounds for the wrongness of abortion, and is a reason not
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only for Bernice but for everyone else as well to accept the
wrongness of abortion. Bernice’s advice is reason to accept
the wrongness of abortion because Emma believes that Bernice
has reasons that ground the wrongness of abortion. Although
Emma is unclear about the nature of these grounds, she is
nevertheless sure of their existence. Moral testimony can provide
access to grounding reasons even to persons who lack an ad-
equate conception of those reasons. Moreover, it is these ground-
ing reasons, if they exist, that are reasons for everyone to accept
the wrongness of abortion and, hence, are reasons to accept the
wrongness of abortion on behalf of others. The principle should
be reformulated as follows:
Well-groundedness
In uttering a moral sentence that he understands, the
grounding reason a competent speaker directly or indirectly
has, if sincere, for accepting the uttered moral sentence
applies not only to the speaker but to everyone else as
well. So, in sincerely uttering a moral sentence that he
understands, a competent speaker accepts that sentence
on behalf of others.
There is one further feature of moral authority that is worth
emphasizing. In accepting the wrongness of abortion, not only
does Bernice accept a reason that takes precedence over non-
moral reasons, that is not contingent upon her acceptance of it,
for which there are grounds not only for her but for everyone to
accept, but in uttering ‘Abortion is wrong’ Bernice is demanding
that everyone accept that it is wrong. Stevenson (1937, 1944)
highlights this feature of moral authority by the ‘do so as well’
component of his analysis. According to Stevenson, Bernice, in
claiming that abortion is wrong, not only represents herself as
disapproving of abortion, but also demands that others do so as
well. In making a moral utterance, a competent speaker de-
mands that his audience accept the uttered moral sentence and
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so come to respond aVectively in the relevant manner. The
relevant response need not be the same as the speaker’s: it may
make sense for the hearer to feel guilty and the speaker to feel
angry, say, but if it does this diVerence is grounded in their
diVerent relative positions in the circumstance and the normative
appearance it presents:
Demand
In uttering a moral sentence that he understands, a compe-
tent speaker demands that his audience accept the uttered
moral sentence.
While Stevenson emphasizes the demand conveyed by moral
utterance, what is perhaps missing in his account is the recogni-
tion that the reasons that ground the acceptance of the uttered
moral sentence are linked with this demand. Thus, MacIntyre
writes:
Stevenson . . . understood very clearly that saying ‘I disapprove of this;
do so as well!’ does not have the same force as ‘This is bad!’ He noted
that a kind of prestige attaches to the latter, which does not attach to
the former. What he did not note however—precisely because he
viewed emotivism as a theory of meaning—is that the prestige derives
from the fact that the use of ‘That is bad!’ implies an appeal to an
objective and impersonal standard in a way in which ‘I disapprove of
this; do so as well!’ does not. (MacIntyre, 1981: 19–20)
Stevenson’s account of moral utterance fails to capture its
authority, since he does not link the conversational demand it
conveys with the reasons for accepting the uttered moral sen-
tence. This is plausibly the source of the traditional criticism that
moral utterance, as Stevenson conceives of it, is a form of
manipulation—since competent speakers demand that others
adopt the relevant emotional attitude without providing them
with a reason for adopting that attitude. The conversational
demand that others accept the uttered moral sentence is justiWed
only if the speaker possesses a grounding reason for accepting
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the uttered moral sentence that applies not only to himself but to
everyone else as well. The conversational demand is justiWed
only if the speaker has suYcient reason to accept the uttered
moral sentence on behalf of others. Demanding that others
accept the uttered moral sentence may require that the speaker
possess a grounding reason that applies not only to himself but
to everyone else as well, but the possession of a grounding reason
only potentially justiWes demanding that others accept the moral
sentence. So, for example, a competent speaker would not be
justiWed in demanding that another accept a moral sentence,
even if he possessed a grounding reason, if, in that context, so
demanding would humiliate the other.
Given the nature of moral authority, moral acceptance is
always accetptance on behalf of others and so is subject to the
appropriate norms. David Hume puts the point this way:
When a man denominates another his enemy, his rival, his antagonist, his
adversary, he is understood to speak the language of self-love, and to
express sentiments, peculiar to himself, and arising from his particular
circumstances and situation. But when he bestows on any man the
epithets of vicious or odious or depraved, he then speaks another lan-
guage, and expresses sentiments, in which, he expects, all his audience
are to concur with him. He must here, therefore, depart from his
private and particular situation, and must chuse a point of view,
common to him and others. (Hume 1751/1988: section 9)
Reacting to Moral Disagreement
Given the nature of moral authority, moral acceptance is always
acceptance on behalf of others. Not only does well-groundedness
entail that accepting a moral sentence involves accepting that
sentence on behalf of others, but the conversational demand
conveyed by moral utterance is intelligible only if sincerely
uttering a moral sentence involves accepting that sentence on
behalf of others. This is epistemically signiWcant; for, taken
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together with noncomplacency, it has the following important
consequence. If moral acceptance is cognitive, then, in the con-
text of a disagreement about reasons, a person is under a lax
obligation to inquire further into the grounds of acceptance. By
contraposition, it follows that if, in the context of a disagreement
about reasons, a person is not under a lax obligation to inquire
further into the grounds of moral acceptance, then moral
acceptance is noncognitive. In this section I will argue for non-
cognitivism on just these grounds.
Edgar and Bernice disagree about the moral status of abor-
tion. Whereas Bernice accepts the wrongness of abortion, Edgar
is a complacent liberal moralist and accepts that abortion is
permissible. Upon discussing the matter, Edgar and Bernice
discover that their disagreement is a disagreement about reasons.
Edgar reasons as follows (Edgar and Bernice’s arguments are
quoted from MacIntyre, 1981)
Everyone has a right over their own person and their own body. Given
the nature of these rights, when an embryo is essentially part of the
mother’s body, the mother has the right to make her own uncoerced
decision on whether she will have an abortion or not. Therefore,
abortion is morally permissible. . . . (MacIntyre, 1981: 6–7)
So Edgar, implicitly at least, accepts a principle that counts a
certain feature of the circumstance, the embryo being essentially
part of the mother’s body, as a reason to accept the permissibility
of abortion. Bernice, however, rejects this principle. Bernice
reasons instead as follows:
I cannot will that my mother should have had an abortion when she
was pregnant with me, except perhaps if it had been certain that
the embryo was dead or gravely damaged. But if I cannot will this in
my own case, how can I consistently deny to others the right to life
I claim for myself ? I would break the so-called Golden Rule unless
I denied that a mother has in general a right to an abortion. (MacIntyre,
1981: 6–7)
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From Bernice’s perspective, the embryo being essentially
part of the mother’s body has a diVerent normative signiWcance.
As a consequence, Edgar and Bernice disagree about what
would count as a reason for accepting or rejecting the sentence
‘Abortion is permissible.’ Edgar and Bernice’s disagreement
about the moral status of abortion is, at bottom, a disagree-
ment about reasons.
In uttering ‘Abortion is permissible’ Edgar demands, implicitly
at least, that his audience accept that sentence. So Edgar
must accept that sentence on behalf of others if his utterance is
sincere. Indeed, Edgar is sincere. He accepts ‘Abortion is permis-
sible’ on behalf of others for he takes himself to have access to
a grounding reason that is a reason to accept that sentence not
only for himself, but for everyone else as well. Bernice, like
Edgar, is motivated to accept on behalf of others a claim about
the moral status of abortion. Supposing that she is an intelligent
and articulate spokesperson, Bernice might strike Edgar as
an otherwise rational and reasonable, informed human being
who coherently accepts a reason that, if genuine, would under-
mine his acceptance of the permissibility of abortion. Neverthe-
less, Edgar feels no embarrassment about this. His persistence in
his liberal morality is unXinching. Edgar is intransigent in
the sense that he lacks a motivation to inquire further into the
grounds of moral acceptance. Nor is Edgar alone in this. I suspect
that we too would be unmoved by such a disagreement.
Our own persistence in liberal morality would be unXinching
as well. We too would be intransigent in the sense of lacking
a motivation to inquire further into the grounds of moral
acceptance. In normal circumstances, we are under no obligation
to re-examine the foundations of moral claims that we accept
as unproblematic even if they are disputed by otherwise
rational and reasonable, informed, and interested people who
coherently accept reasons that, if genuine, would undermine
them.
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I am not making an empirical claim about the actual extent of
moral intransigence—that would require a sensitive interpret-
ation of a moral sociology that has yet to be written; rather, I am
making a conceptual claim about the norms that actually govern
moral acceptance: Given the norms that we actually accept, it is
intelligible to fail to be motivated to inquire further. If we can
conceive of cases where such intransigence is intelligible, then it
must be so at least by the norms governing moral acceptance
that we actually accept and tacitly appeal to in so conceiving. Not
only is it intelligible that one, as a matter of fact, takes no positive
steps towards re-examining the grounds of moral acceptance—
after all, one might have more compelling immediate concerns;
but it is intelligible as well that one should lack this motivation
altogether. And if the failure to adopt the end of further inquiry is
intelligible, then we are under no rational obligation to adopt
this end, at least by the norms of moral acceptance that we
actually, if implicitly, accept.
As an illustration of this, consider Hilary Putnam’s admirable
description of the deep political disagreement between Nozick
and himself:
But what of the fundamentals on which one cannot agree? It would
be dishonest to pretend that one thinks that there are no better
and worse views here. I don’t think that it is just a matter of taste
whether one thinks that the obligation of the community to treat
its members with compassion takes precedence over property rights;
nor does my co-disputant. Each of us regards the other as lacking,
at this level, a certain kind of sensitivity and perception. To be perfectly
honest, there is in each of us something akin to contempt, not for
the other’s mind—for we each have the highest regard for each
other’s minds—nor for the other as a person—, for I have more respect
for my colleague’s honesty, integrity, kindness, etc., than I do for that of
many people who agree with my ‘liberal’ political views—but for
a certain complex of emotions and judgments in the other. (Putnam,
1981: 165)
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Putnam should be commended for his candour here. What
Putnam holds in something akin to contempt is Nozick’s moral
sensibility (‘a certain complex of emotions and judgments in the
other’)—a moral sensibility that privileges property rights over
what Putnam regards as the compassionate treatment of the less
well oV. Nozick is a reasonable and interested person who
accepts reasons that, if genuine, would undermine Putnam’s
commitment to liberal morality. But if Putnam holds Nozick’s
moral sensibility in something akin to contempt, what motiv-
ation would Nozick’s accepting an undermining reason provide
Putnam for inquiring further into the grounds of moral accept-
ance? None. Thus, the reaction that Putnam carefully describes is
a manifestation of moral intransigence. The important point,
however, is that Putnam’s reaction is not obviously unintelligible.
And if it isn’t, then under such circumstances we would be under
no obligation to re-examine the foundations of the liberal mor-
ality we accept, if we do.
Relativity and Error
The argument from intransigence can be summarized as follows.
If acceptance were cognitive, then, in the context of a disagree-
ment about reasons, a person would be under a lax obligation to
inquire further into the grounds of acceptance. This, however, is
plausible only if acceptance is understood as acceptance on behalf
of others. Given the nature of its authority, however, moral ac-
ceptance is always acceptance on behalf of others. So if
moral acceptancewere cognitive, then in the context of a disagree-
ment about reasons, a person would be under a lax obligation to
inquire further into the grounds ofmoral acceptance.However, in
the context of a disagreement about reasons, a person is under no
obligation to inquire further into the grounds of moral
acceptance. Therefore, moral acceptance must be noncognitive.
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A moral relativist might object that the argument from in-
transigence is unsound. According to moral relativism, moral
acceptance is belief in a moral proposition; it is just that
the moral proposition has relative truth-conditions. Thus, if
Edgar accepts that abortion is permissible, he believes that abor-
tion is permissible, but that proposition is true only relative to
a moral framework: abortion is represented as permissible
only relative to the moral framework in which Edgar partici-
pates. Similarly, if Bernice accepts that abortion is wrong, she
believes that abortion is wrong, but that proposition is true only
relative to a moral framework: abortion is represented as wrong
only relative to the moral framework in which Bernice partici-
pates. Suppose that Edgar and Bernice participate in distinct
moral frameworks. A disagreement about reasons would
not motivate Edgar to inquire further into the grounds of
moral acceptance, any more than a disagreement about the
perceived location of a rainbow would motivate him to inquire
about the ‘true,’ or perspective-independent, location of the
rainbow. Thus, according to the envisioned moral relativist,
moral acceptance is cognitive, but in a disagreement about
reasons a person is under no obligation to inquire further into
the grounds of acceptance. The relativist provides an alternative
explanation for the intelligibility of intransigence, and one that is
consistent with cognitivism. He would thus object that the
argument from intransigence is unsound because it involves a
false premise:
If moral acceptance is cognitive, then, in the context of a
disagreement about reasons, a person is under a lax obligation
to inquire further into the grounds of moral acceptance.
The relativist makes a natural assumption—that, in a disagree-
ment about reasons, the disputants participate in distinct moral
frameworks. However, it is unclear why this assumption is
invariably true. Why couldn’t a disagreement about reasons
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arise within a single moral framework? After all, such moral
frameworks, if they exist, are the contingent products of
human culture and history. It is thus implausible to suppose
that they are complete in the sense of partitioning the practical
alternatives open to a person as permissible, forbidden, or
obligatory in every possible circumstance. Unforeseen circum-
stances may give rise to practical alternatives unclassiWed by
the moral framework. Indeed, there may be diVerent ways of
naturally extending the given framework to take these into
account. But if this is the basis of the disagreement about
reasons, then there is a clear sense in which the disputants
participate in the same moral framework: they would be dis-
agreeing about how to extend the incomplete moral framework
that they share.
This is not the only way a disagreement about reasons can
arise within a single moral framework. Consider a disagreement
about the justice of an institutional policy. The disputants might
disagree, for example, about the justice of an institutional policy,
even though they agree about the description of the circum-
stance and the probable outcomes, and share substantially the
same conception of justice. They might nevertheless reasonably
disagree about how to apply the principles of justice they share to
the circumstance as they commonly understand it. They would
be engaged in a disagreement in reasons despite their common
moral framework. If a disagreement about reasons can arise
within a single moral framework, then, at least in these cases,
the relativist loses his explanation for why the disputants are
under no obligation to inquire further into the grounds of
acceptance.
The relativist objection rests on a false, though natural, as-
sumption—that in a disagreement about reasons the disputants
participate in distinct moral frameworks. However, even if this
diYculty were avoided, the relativist would face serious diYcul-
ties. The relativist denies the following:
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If moral acceptance is cognitive, then, in the context of a
disagreement about reasons, a person is under a lax obliga-
tion to inquire further into the grounds of moral accept-
ance.
However, this was a consequence of two claims:
Noncomplacency
If acceptance is cognitive and on behalf of others, then, in
the context of a disagreement about reasons, a person is
under a lax obligation to inquire further into the grounds of
acceptance.
Authority
Given its authority, moral acceptance is always acceptance
on behalf of others.
This is the basis of a dilemma: the relativist must deny either
noncomplacency or authority. Recall that noncomplacency was
urged on general grounds. So, if a relativist were to deny it, his
relativism would no longer be conWned to moral inquiry, but
would instead be a form of epistemic relativism more generally.
Epistemic relativism, however, is a controversial doctrine and
should not be accepted merely by reXecting on the intelligibility
of moral intransigence (but see Rosen, 2001, for a recent de-
fence). If, on the other hand, the relativist were to deny author-
ity—that moral acceptance is always acceptance on behalf of
others—either by denying it outright or by restricting its scope,
say, to those who are co-participants in a moral framework, he
risks giving an unacceptably deXationary account of moral au-
thority. These are serious diYculties, if not, perhaps, decisive
ones. However, they suYce to cast doubt on the claim that
relativist’s alternative is clearly the better explanation of the
intelligibility of moral intransigence. Indeed, the prevalence of
relativist rhetoric in a moral culture might be a symptom of its
noncognitive nature, since it might be a confused acknowledg-
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ment of the intelligibility of moral intransigence that is best
explained by noncognitivism.
An error theorist might also object to the soundness of the
argument, though on diVerent grounds.
Noncognitivists are committed to a nonmoral explanation of
moral acceptance. But noncognitivists are not the only ones with
this explanatory commitment. Consider the kind of error theory
that Mackie (1977) espoused. Mackie held that moral facts are
‘queer’ (or would be if there were any) and best not believed in.
So, according to Mackie, there are no moral facts. But if there are
no moral facts, then a competent speaker’s acceptance of a moral
sentence cannot be subject to a moral explanation. Moral ac-
ceptance might be belief, but the explanation for moral accept-
ance cannot be that the moral facts are thus and so and that the
speaker is justiWed in believing them to be, as the realist main-
tains. The explanation for why a speaker accepts a moral sen-
tence must be a nonmoral explanation. Indeed, the nonmoral
explanation might take the form that noncognitivists recom-
mend. Sometimes belief can be explained in terms of the non-
cognitive attitudes of the believer. Wishful thinking is a case in
point. Bernice believed that England would win the World Cup.
However, her belief was not the product of an impartial assess-
ment of comparative merit; rather, she believed that England
would win because she desperately wanted them to. Similarly,
the error theorist might claim that, in accepting a moral sen-
tence, a speaker believes the proposition expressed not because
the moral facts are as the proposition represents them to be, but
because of the noncognitive attitudes of the speaker. So for
example the error theorist might claim that Edgar believes that
it is good to help those in need, not because helping those in
need instantiates the property of goodness, but rather because of
his compassion for the needy.
Suppose an error theorist maintains that moral acceptance is
subject not only to a nonmoral explanation but to a noncognitive
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explanation as well. This might seem to undermine the case for
noncognitivism. Suppose moral sentences were best explained in
terms of the noncognitive attitudes of the speaker. This is con-
sistent with the possibility that a competent speaker, in accepting
what he does on the basis of his noncognitive attitudes, is getting
things systematically wrong.
The alleged diYculty is a product of not clearly distinguishing
noncognitivism from noncognitive explanations of moral accept-
ance. It is one thing to claim that moral acceptance is subject to a
noncognitive explanation; it is quite another to claim that moral
acceptance is noncognitive. To claim that moral acceptance is
noncognitive is to make a claim about the norms governing
acceptance. If moral acceptance is in this sense noncognitive,
then of course a competent speaker’s acceptance of a moral
claim will be subject to a noncognitive explanation. However,
as our discussion of the error theory reveals, just because moral
acceptance is subject to a noncognitive explanation, it does not
follow that moral acceptance is noncognitive. Perhaps accept-
ance is belief. The fact that moral acceptance is best explained by
the noncognitive attitudes of the speaker would then show only
that the norms governing acceptance were being systematically
violated. A noncognitive explanation of moral acceptance does
not by itself establish the truth of noncognitivism. However, the
conclusion of the argument from intransigence is not merely that
moral acceptance is best explained by some attitude other than
moral belief. Rather, as the intelligibility of moral intransigence
reveals, the norms governing moral acceptance diVer from the
norms appropriate to belief. Thus, the error theorist’s objection
mistakes a conceptual claim about the norms that actually gov-
ern moral acceptance for an empirical claim about what actually
explains moral acceptance. It ignores the way in which a poten-
tial explanatory diVerence between cognitivists and noncogniti-
vists is a manifestation of a more fundamental normative
diVerence.
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The Argument from Aspect Shift
The argument from intransigence, if sound, only establishes the
noncognitivist’s distinctive denial. It remains silent, however,
about the nature of the attitudes involved in moral acceptance.
It is natural to ask: if moral acceptance is noncognitive, what
kind of attitude is it? In this section we will consider a supple-
mentary argument for noncognitivism, the argument from as-
pect shift, which has an informative conclusion about the nature
of these attitudes. While not, even suitably elaborated, a full and
substantive account of the nature of moral acceptance, the
conclusion nevertheless provides positive information about
the kind of attitudes involved in accepting a moral sentence.
So far, in discussing disagreements about reasons, we have
naturally focused on interpersonal disagreement. However, cor-
responding to public moral conXict there is the possibility of
private conXict: there could be intrapersonal disagreement cor-
responding to interpersonal disagreement. SpeciWcally, in argu-
ing for noncognitivism, the suggestion is that a disagreement
about reasons might be approached from the deliberative per-
spective of a single practical reasoner.
There is an aspect of the phenomenology of intrapersonal
conXict that is presently relevant. Emma is unsure about the
moral status of abortion. She is genuinely undecided about
the permissibility of abortion, even having considered Edgar
and Bernice’s explicit arguments. When Emma reXects on the
rights people have over their own persons, certain features of her
circumstance become salient and present a certain normative
signiWcance. SpeciWcally, in rehearsing Edgar’s argument, Emma
has a tendency to focus on a material feature of the circumstance,
the embryo being essentially a part of the mother, and a ten-
dency to count this a reason for permitting abortion as well as a
tendency to rule out other features of the circumstance, such as
the inability to universalize the decision to abort, as a reason for
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forbidding abortion. However, when she reXects on the value of
her decisions, universalizing diVerent features of her circum-
stance become salient and seem to have a diVerent normative
signiWcance. SpeciWcally, in rehearsing Bernice’s argument,
Emma has a tendency to focus on a formal feature of the
circumstance, the inability to universalize a decision to abort,
and a tendency to count that as a reason for forbidding abortion
as well as a tendency to rule out other features of the circum-
stance, such as the embryo being essentially part of the mother,
as a reason for permitting abortion. The rival arguments diVer-
ently structure the reasons apparently available in the given
circumstance. From the perspective of rights, certain features of
the circumstance count as reasons and others are ruled out.
From the perspective of universalizability, diVerent features of
the circumstance count as reasons and yet others are ruled out
(compare Nagel, 1979: essay 9.) Since she cannot reconcile these
arguments in a single coherent normative framework, Emma, in
moving between these distinct normative perspectives, experi-
ences what can only be described as a normative aspect shift: in
moving between these distinct normative perspectives, diVerent
features of her circumstance become salient and seem to take on
a diVerent normative signiWcance. Thus Ulrich, the protagonist
of Musil’s The Man without Qualities explains:
I maintained that a general who for strategic reasons sends his battal-
ions to certain doom is a murderer, if you think of them as thousands of
mothers’ sons, but that he immediately becomes something else seen
from another perspective, such as, for example, the necessity of
sacriWce, or the insigniWcance of life’s short span. (Musil, 1995: 295)
Noncognitivism provides the best explanation for the norma-
tive aspect shift involved in the phenomenology of intrapersonal
conXict. Consider the way a normative perspective structures a
person’s moral consciousness. Adopting a normative perspective
involves a tendency for certain features of the circumstance to
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become salient in perception, thought, and imagination, and a
tendency for these features to present a certain complex norma-
tive appearance. A normative perspective structures a person’s
moral consciousness in just the way that a certain kind of aVect
structures a person’s consciousness.
Consider erotic desire. Edgar walks into a crowded room and
is immediately struck by the presence of his beloved, Bernice.
Bernice is immediately perceptually salient. Edgar experiences
Bernice as quite literally standing out of the crowd. Bernice’s
salience is not merely conWned to his perception. Ed has, as well,
a tendency to focus on Bernice in thought and imagination. Not
only is Bernice salient, but her desirability is also manifest in a
phenomenologically vivid manner. Indeed in his vulnerable mo-
ments this phenomenologically vivid sense of Bernice’s desirabil-
ity can be unbearable and thus has a tendency to be shy-making.
Not only does Ed have a tendency to see Bernice as desirable, but
he also has a tendency to rule out from consideration certain
features of Bernice that, to others at least, might count against
her desirability. So, for example, he has a tendency to overlook
certain annoying habits such as Bernice’s penchant for chewing
on pens when concentrating. It is not that Bernice’s pen chewing
is outweighed by her manifest desirability. At least in this in-
stance, for Ed it is not even an issue. Indeed, Ed is so far gone that
he sees Bernice’s pen chewing as contributing to her unique
charm. So Ed’s desiring Bernice involves, among other things,
a tendency for Bernice to become salient in perception, thought,
and imagination as well as a tendency for her to present a certain
normative appearance. Indeed, Scanlon (1998: chapter 1) charac-
terizes a certain kind of aVect, what he calls desire in the directed
attention sense, precisely in terms of these eVects. SpeciWcally,
according to Scanlon, a desire in the directed attention sense
involves a tendency to focus on the object of desire as well as a
tendency for the object of desire to appear in a favourable light.
(There is a sense in which the label ‘desire in the directed
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attention’ sense is inapt—it suggests a too narrow construal of
the relevant kind of aVect. SpeciWcally, it suggests that the con-
stituent normative appearance is invariably positive. However,
whatever Scanlon’s intention, I am not assuming that the object
of the aVect invariably appears in a favorable light, only that there
is a tendency for the object of the aVect to have a certain
normative appearance, whether or not that appearance is posi-
tive.) So it seems that a normative perspective structures a
person’s moral consciousness in just the way a certain kind of
aVect, desire in the directed attention sense, structures a person’s
consciousness.
This might be so if a person’s normative perspective were just
their being disposed to respond aVectively in the relevant man-
ner. If that is right, then the normative aspect shift involved in the
phenomenology of intrapersonal conXict is subject to a noncog-
nitive explanation. From the perspective of rights, certain fea-
tures of the circumstance count as reasons and others are
excluded. From the perspective of universalizability, diVerent
features of the circumstance count as reasons and yet others
are excluded. Emma, in moving between these distinct norma-
tive perspectives, experiences a normative aspect shift. This nor-
mative aspect shift is nothing other than Emma’s vacillating
between distinct and incompatible aVective responses to her
circumstance. In being unclear about the moral status of abor-
tion, Emma quite literally does not know what to feel about it.
(Thus Hume, 1740/2003: 3.1.2: ‘Morality, therefore, is more prop-
erly felt than judg’d of ’.)
This hypothesis receives some independent support by the
rhetorical strategies deployed when reasons give out in basic
moral disagreement. Thus, Edgar, in trying to persuade Bernice
of the permissibility of abortion after she has listened to and
rejected his explicit argument, might do any and all of the
following: he might exhort Bernice to see it like this . . . , to
consider certain pertinent analogies as well as certain cases
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whose description has a narrative structure that expresses
Edgar’s feelings about abortion—he might even resort to brow-
beating. These and other rhetorical strategies are essentially
literary devices for focusing the audience’s attention on certain
features of the circumstance and presenting those features in a
certain normative light. Such rhetorical strategies, when artfully
deployed, get the audience to respond aVectively in the relevant
way to the given circumstance—they frame the perspective of
the audience so as to induce the relevant aVect. By such means
Edgar might try to instill in Bernice what Putnam (1981: 165)
describes as a ‘certain complex of emotions and judgments.’ In
this way, a familiar, intuitionist rhetoric can have a noncognitive
use. (See McIntyre, 1981: chapter 2; but see McDowell, 1998,
essays 3, 10, for a diVerent interpretation of this rhetoric.)
So far, the relevant kind of aVect has been characterized in
terms of its functional role, i.e. in terms of the tendency for
certain features of the circumstance to become salient in percep-
tion, thought, and imagination and the tendency for these fea-
tures to present a certain normative appearance. But why do
these eVects hang together? What is it about the nature of this
attitude that explains and renders intelligible that it should have
this functional role?—Johnston (2001) forcefully presses this ques-
tion. McDowell (1998: essays 3, 10) suggests that it is ‘natural’ for
the noncognitivist to conceive of this attitude as a mixed state, a
noncognitive reWnement of sensing, where the noncognitive
component is the source of the normative appearance. McDo-
well has done much to discredit the claim that the relevant kind
of aVect can be understood as a mixed state involving perceptual
and noncognitive components that can be independently spe-
ciWed. Even if this kind of account were untenable and were the
only substantive speciWcation of the relevant kind of aVect avail-
able to the noncognitivist, why should the noncognitivist provide
a substantive account of desire in the directed attention sense?
Why should desire in the directed attention sense be understood
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as an attitude whose nature can be speciWed independently of its
functional role, and can explain and render intelligible why this
attitude has that functional role?
If the aVect were conceived to be a particular event in a
person’s consciousness (a ‘feeling,’ in the philosopher’s sense),
then it would be reasonable to assume that its nature would be
manifest in the way it structures a person’s consciousness, and so
reasonable to assume that the nature of the aVect would explain
and render intelligible the tendency of the object of the aVect to
become salient and the tendency for it to present a certain
normative appearance. However, to assume at the outset that
the aVect is a particular conscious event is to overlook a meta-
physical option available to the noncognitivist. Perhaps the aVect
is not some particular event in a person’s consciousness, but the
way in which events in the person’s consciousness are structured.
The suggestion is that there is nothing more to being an aVect of
the relevant kind than the tendency for certain features of the
circumstance to become salient in perception, thought, and
imagination, and the tendency for these features to present a
certain normative appearance. The minimalist denies that a per-
son’s being in an aVective state consists in some further fact over
and above the relevant way in which the person’s consciousness
is structured. Minimalism is thus the analogue in the philosophy
of mind of T. S. Eliot’s notion of the ‘objective correlative’:
The only way of expressing emotion in the form of art is by Wnding an
‘objective correlative’; in other words, a set of objects, a situation,
a chain of events which shall be the formula of that particular emotion;
such that when the external facts, which must terminate in sensory
experience, are given, the emotion is immediately evoked. (Eliot, 1932:
145)
This conception of emotional expression in art is the basis of
Eliot’s criticism of Hamlet: the emotion that has Hamlet in its
grips is inexpressible precisely because it is a further fact over and
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above the structure of events in the narrative, and for this reason
Eliot reckons the play a failure:
If you examine any of Shakespeare’s more successful tragedies, you will
Wnd this exact equivalence; you will Wnd that the state of mind of Lady
Macbeth walking in her sleep has been communicated to you by a
skilful accumulation of imagined sensory impressions; the words of
Macbeth on hearing of his wife’s death strike us as if, given the
sequence of events, these words were automatically released by
the last event in the series. The artistic ‘inevitability’ lies in this
complete adequacy of the external to the emotion; and this is precisely
what is deWcient in Hamlet. Hamlet (the man) is dominated by an
emotion which is inexpressible, because it is in excess of the facts as
they appear. (Eliot, 1932: 145)
Just as Eliot contends that it is the structure of the events in the
narrative (‘the facts as they appear’), and not some further fact,
that constitutes the expression of emotion, the minimalist con-
tends that it is the structure of the events in a person’s conscious-
ness, and not some further fact, that constitutes the relevant
aVect.
McDowell (1998: essays 3, 10) suggests that it is ‘natural’ for the
noncognitivist to conceive of this attitude as a mixed state,
a noncognitive reWnement of sensing, where the cognitive and
noncognitive components can be independently speciWed and
where the nature of this mixed state explains and renders intel-
ligible the way a person’s consciousness is structured. According
to the minimalist, desire in the directed attention sense is a mixed
state: it is a noncognitive attitude that involves thoughts and
perceptions about the morally salient features of the circum-
stance. However these attitudes are not distinct and so cannot
be independently speciWed; nor can they explain the way they
structure a person’s consciousness. The thoughts and percep-
tions involved in moral acceptance are events in a person’s
consciousness whose structure constitutes the relevant aVect.
So, even if a substantive account of desire in the directed
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attention sense were unavailable to the noncognitivist for the
reasons McDowell describes, a noncognitivist might still claim
that the relevant aVect is nothing other than the tendency for
certain features of the circumstance to become salient in percep-
tion, thought, and imagination and the tendency for them to
present a certain complex normative appearance.
If one accepts the minimalist account of desire in the directed
attention sense, then the case for noncognitivism is strength-
ened. It would no longer be a question of noncognitivism pro-
viding the best explanation for the normative aspect shift:
minimalism and the claim that the aVect is noncognitive would
entail a noncognitive account of normative aspect shift.
Accepting a moral sentence will seem reasonable, given an
appropriate background normative perspective. From the nor-
mative perspective of rights, accepting that abortion is permis-
sible might seem reasonable. From the perspective of
universalizability, accepting that abortion is wrong might seem
reasonable. Given that the adoption of a normative perspective is
just a matter of appropriately conWguring one’s aVective sensibil-
ity, it is plausible that moral acceptance is itself noncognitive.
Moreover, if it is, then it is no surprise that it should lack a
cognitive virtue that genuine belief displays.
Conclusion
Moral acceptance is noncognitive. SpeciWcally, moral acceptance
centrally involves a certain kind of aVect, what Scanlon (1998)
describes as a desire in the directed attention sense. In accepting a
moral sentence that he understands, a competent speaker
reconWgures his aVective sensibility so as to render salient, in a
phenomenologically vivid manner, the moral reasons apparently
available in the circumstance, as he understands it. In accepting a
moral sentence that he understands, a competent speaker quite
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literally decides how he feels about things. It is the structure of a
person’s moral consciousness, and not some further fact, that
constitutes the relevant kind of aVect. The relevant aVect is
nothing over and above the tendency for certain features of the
circumstance to become salient in perception, thought, and
imagination, and for these to present a certain complex norma-
tive appearance. SpeciWcally, certain features of the circumstance
become salient and appear to be reasons for acting, while other
features potentially cease to be salient and can appear to be
outweighed or even ruled out as reasons for doing otherwise,
even if, in normal circumstances, they would count as such
reasons. The salient features appear to be reasons that are not
contingent upon our acceptance of them. Moreover, potentially
distinct features of the circumstance become salient and appear
to be reasons for accepting the moral sentence, and these reasons
directly or indirectly involve grounding reasons, reasons that
ground the deontic status of the relevant practical alternatives.
These grounding reasons appear to be reasons not only for the
speaker, but for everyone else as well. They appear to be suY-
cient reason for accepting that sentence on behalf of others.
From this perspective, the competent speaker can seem justiWed
in demanding that others accept the moral sentence and so come
to respond aVectively in the relevant manner. The aVects cen-
trally involved in moral acceptance are in this way essentially
other regarding.
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